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INTRODUCTION
The modern class action, the modern feminist movement, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were all products of the crea-
tivity and turmoil of the 1960s. As late as 1961—one year after Justice
Felix Frankfurter rejected new law school graduate Ruth Bader
Ginsburg as a law clerk because she was a woman1—the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a Florida statute
that required men, but not women, to serve on juries, on the ground
that women’s primary role was in the home.2 As Betty Friedan put it
in 1963’s The Feminine Mystique, “In almost every professional field,
in business and in the arts and sciences, women are still treated as
second-class citizens.”3 But change was imminent. The Equal Pay Act
of 1963,4 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 the founding of the
† Associate Dean of Research & Faculty Development & Associate Professor of Law,
Seattle University School of Law. The authors would like to thank Maureen Carroll,
Maggie Chon, David Marcus, and Zach Clopton for their helpful comments. The essay also
benefitted greatly from presentations at the Rule 23@50 N.Y.U. Conference and at the
Seattle University School of Law Social Justice Colloquium. Finally, thanks to Mimi Lei,
Ryan Lynch, Grace Thompson, and Emily Yoshiwara for their excellent research assis-
tance. Copyright © 2017 by Elizabeth G. Porter & Brooke D. Coleman.
‡ Charles I. Stone Professor of Law & Associate Professor of Law, University of
Washington School of Law.
1 See Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as a Clerk,
Chosen as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1993), http://
www.nytimes.com/1993/06/15/us/supreme-court-woman-rejected-clerk-chosen-justice-ruth-
joan-bader-ginsburg.html.
2 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961) (upholding murder conviction by an all-male
jury of woman who killed her husband).
3 Betty Friedan, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 508 (Norton ed. 2001) (1963).
4 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it “an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
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ACLU Women’s Rights Project,6 and a rising social and intellectual
feminist movement brought women’s equality into the national con-
versation.7 Simultaneously—at least in part in response to the civil
rights movement and the Civil Rights Act8—an (all-male) Judicial
Conference9 and Supreme Court in 1966 ushered in the modern era of
collective litigation by promulgating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, and more specifically, Rule 23(b)(2), which provided a formal
structure for civil rights plaintiffs to seek aggregate relief for viola-
tions of federal and state anti-discrimination laws.10 Together, these
phenomena gave impetus to communities of women to combat legal
and cultural injustices through the courts. The result has been wide-
spread improvement in the lives of working women—and men—
across many industries.11
In this Article, we examine the interplay of Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions, feminism, and Title VII sex discrimination doctrine over the
past fifty years to show that the theoretical concept of commonality—
cohesion, unity—in the women’s movement has had a significant
impact on the ability of women to seek collective redress for work-
place discrimination through class actions. We describe how the four
“waves” of feminism since the 1960s find corresponding analogues in
the development of Title VII class action law. Beginning in the civil
rights era, feminism became an entrenched part of mainstream Amer-
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
. . . sex”).
6 Lenora M. Lapidus, 30 Years of Women’s Rights Litigation: An Evolving
Constitutional Standard of Review, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 237, 241 (2002) (referencing
the founding of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, founded “by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1971”).
7 DOROTHY SUE COBBLE ET AL., FEMINISM UNFINISHED 71 (2014) (naming the
feminist movement the largest social movement in the nation).
8 See Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014) (noting influence of desegregation
cases on rulemakers); see also David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part
I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 599–601 (2013) (noting that
rulemakers “appreciated the contribution the class action had made, as a substitute for
government enforcement, to the desegregation cause”).
9 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judicial Conference of the United States: Members, https://
www.fjc.gov/history/administration/judicial-conference-united-states-members (last visited
Sept. 1, 2017) (listing all members of the Judicial Conference and their dates of service).
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 1:15, at 38–39 (5th ed. 2011) (“Congress enacted the amended Rules 23 in 1966
following the typical rules adoption process.”).
11 See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995,
1009 (2015) (“Who would have imagined the law addressing single-sex hiring, sex-plus
discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, affirmative action, sex stereotyping, same-
sex harassment, caregiver discrimination, discrimination based on gender identity, and,
within the foreseeable future, sexual orientation?”).
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ican culture. Over time, however, feminism’s influence waned as
critics from within and without the movement attacked fundamental
tensions inherent in the feminist project and as so-called identity
politics fell out of fashion.12
Class actions underwent a parallel evolution. They gained legiti-
macy and momentum through the early 1980s, as judges became
increasingly comfortable with Rule 23’s flexibility and potential effi-
ciencies.13 Yet even as class actions became a conventional part of the
litigation landscape, a backlash took hold as courts and scholars began
to question the ways in which class actions warp the traditional incen-
tive structures of litigation.14 In 2011, these interrelated legal and
social challenges collided in the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart
v. Dukes15, which reversed the certification of a class of 1.5 million
women employed by Wal-Mart alleging sex discrimination under Title
VII. If Rule 23(b)(2) and Title VII together opened a door to enforce-
ment of women’s rights at work, in some ways Wal-Mart is a partial
closing of that door.
This is not an empirical study, nor is it comprehensive. Rather,
our aim is to generate thought as to ways in which class action doc-
trine simultaneously reflects and reinforces evolving views of femi-
nism and gender equality. We acknowledge that class actions are not
the sole standard bearers for impact litigation, and that individual
suits—whether brought by individuals of any gender or by physi-
cians—have been vital to the establishment of anti-discrimination
legal norms in the area of gender equality.16 Even so, we argue that
12 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 622
(1990) (“How can [feminist legal] critics build a unified political and analytical stance from
women’s varying perceptions of their varying experiences? And what entitles that stance to
special authority?”).
13 See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II:
Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981-1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.  (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015581.
14 See id. (manuscript at 13).
15 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
16 In many instances, individual suits—and not class actions—have more effectively
disrupted legal regimes in ways that advance gender equity. See Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015) (holding that individual may show disparate treatment
under Pregnancy Discrimination Act by making out prima facie case of discrimination
similar to Title VII case); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding
unconstitutional laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman, a traditional definition
that frequently relegated women to subordinate status in the home); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that Idaho statute compelling preference for assigning men over
women who are equally entitled to administer estates of the deceased was arbitrary and
violated Equal Protection Clause); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not permit different sets of hiring policies
for men and women).
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Rule 23(b)(2) suits continue to serve a vital function by allowing
women to enforce those established norms, overcoming classic bar-
riers to judicial justice such as lack of resources, lack of access to law-
yers, and retaliation by employers against individuals who file suit.17
As Anita Hill recently argued in a critique of the technology sector,
“Class action lawsuits can force industry-wide change, even in the
most entrenched, male-dominated industries.”18
Or at least, they could, at one point. The continuing trend toward
tightening certification requirements, minimizing reliance on statistics,
and shunting suits into individualized arbitration threatens to under-
mine the enforcement function that is central to Rule 23(b)(2).19
Finally, we conclude by noting the relative decline of feminist legal
theory over the past 20 years, particularly but not only in the field of
civil procedure.20 Feminist criticism, perhaps due to its association
with identity politics, has waned.21 Yet the questions raised in
Wal-Mart—of commonality and individualism, of structural discrimi-
nation and discretion, and of equality and accommodation of differ-
ence—remain central theoretical problems for today’s women. As the
2016 presidential campaign and the 2017 Women’s March on
Washington—the largest single-day social protest in the history of the
United States22—show, sex discrimination is not a relic of the past.
17 See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 799–804
(2016) (creating a typology of cases that must be resolved through class actions in contrast
to cases where an individual suit might achieve a similar result).
18 Anita Hill, Class Actions Could Fight Discrimination in Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2017).
19 See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text.
20 The modern heyday of feminist civil procedure scholarship was during the early
1990s and was largely led by scholars like Elizabeth Schneider and Judith Resnik. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1223
(1993) (discussing critical ways in which gender influences procedure). Schneider and
Resnik have continued some of this work. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers
of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705
(2007). With a few exceptions, not many other current feminist scholars have taken up the
issues of how gender intersects with procedure. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of
Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999)
(studying the problems of resolving hostile work environment claims at summary
judgment); Danya Shocair Reda, Critical Conflicts Between First-Wave and Feminist
Critical Approaches to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (2011)
(considering the differences between feminist and first-wave critical responses to
alternative dispute resolution); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Beyond the Pronoun: Toward an Anti-
Subordinating Method of Process, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2000) (discussing the impact
of procedure on women and, more specifically, the poor).
21 See, e.g., MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL (2017) (arguing that
identity politics has weakened and almost destroyed liberalism).
22 See Jeremy Pressman & Erica Chenoweth, Compilation of Women’s March Crowd
Size Estimates, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xa0iLqYKz8x9Yc_rfhtmSOJQ
2EGgeUVjvV4A8LsIaxY/htmlview?sle=true#gid=0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (estimating
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Feminism continues to be not only relevant, but vital, and legal
scholars should renew their focus on feminist theory and other issues
relating to sex discrimination.
I
THE WAVES OF FEMINISM & CLASS ACTIONS
Beginning in the 1960s, the waves of feminism and the evolution
of class action doctrine behave like plot lines on a chart, sometimes
intersecting and other times moving away from each other. This sec-
tion briefly describes that evolution. It will first trace the four periods,
or waves, of feminism and feminist thought. It will then show how
theoretical and political debates about whether gender is an essential
difference that deserves legal recognition played out in the context of
class actions, which were evolving in analogous stages.
A. Waves of Feminism
Although it is difficult to confine diffuse social movements within
narrow time periods, scholars and activists describe four periods, or
waves, of American feminism—or at least three and a half.23 The first,
which is often dated to the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848,24 sought
fundamental legal rights for women: the right to vote, to own prop-
erty, and to have custodial rights over children.25 This groundbreaking
phase of American feminism took place without the benefit of either
the Civil Rights Act or of Rule 23. Beginning with the establishment
of a birth control clinic in 1916 by Margaret Sanger, this wave of femi-
that between 3,267,134 and 5,246,670 people participated in a Women’s March in D.C. or
elsewhere in the United States, not including international marches).
23 For an excellent and recent history of American feminism, including a description of
the four periods, or waves, of feminism, see generally COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7. In
keeping with the deconstructionist strain central to feminism, the term “wave” has been
criticized for its American-centric view of feminism, and for its failure to demarcate
progress over time. See SHIRA TARRANT, WHEN SEX BECAME GENDER 23 (2006).
24 See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 77 (1959) (“In regarding the
Seneca Falls convention as the birth of the movement for woman’s rights, we are on solid
ground only if we remember that birth is a stage in the whole process of growth.”).
25 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Introduction: Finding Our Paradoxes, Affirming Our
Beyond, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1989) (“The problem writers identified
centered on the exclusion of women from the rights and prerogatives granted to at least
some men. The goals in this first stage included securing rights to vote and to hold the same
jobs as men.”). See generally NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN,
MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); AILEEN S.
KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1971)
(discussing the history of the women’s suffrage movement during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
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nism also laid the foundation for reproductive rights.26 Notwith-
standing these milestones, women were systematically excluded from
power in the workforce during this time, an exclusion that was doubly
harmful for working class women and women of color.27 Although
interest in organized feminism waned after the passage of the 19th
Amendment, feminists continued to push for social change in the
interwar period, proposing the Equal Rights Amendment and joining
labor movements.28 Even during this early period of American femi-
nism, however, there was a cultural divide between (generally more
privileged) “equality feminists,” who prioritized seeking formal legal
equality with men through developments like the ERA, and the so-
called “social justice feminists,” who were more focused on the prag-
matic needs of working-class women and women of color. These dif-
ferences persisted throughout the 1940s and 1950s.29
Feminism’s second wave—the modern women’s rights move-
ment—gained momentum in the 1960s, resulting in the passage and
enforcement by courts of Title VII,30 the formation of the National
Organization for Women (NOW) and other smaller women’s rights
groups, and the 1968 bra-burning at the Miss America pageant.31 It is
during this second wave that the amended Rule 23 came into being
and matured. Second-wave feminists radically altered the legal and
cultural landscape for American women, successfully advocating for
battered women’s shelters, reproductive rights, equal access to jobs
that explicitly or functionally excluded women, sexual harassment pol-
26 See Margaret Sanger, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.biography.com/
people/margaret-sanger-9471186 (describing Sanger’s opening of the first birth control
clinic in the United States and subsequent reproductive rights advocacy work). See
generally PETER BAGGE, WOMAN REBEL: THE MARGARET SANGER STORY (2013)
(providing overview of Sanger’s life and national image).
27 See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 159–60 (1983) (describing class and
racial divides of first wave feminist and suffrage movements); PENINA MIGDA GLAZER &
MIRIAM SLATER, UNEQUAL COLLEAGUES: THE ENTRANCE OF WOMEN INTO THE
PROFESSIONS, 1890-1940 (1987).
28 COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 15–23 (discussing the ways in which various women
reformers impacted the labor movement before and during the New Deal era).
29 Id. at 37–43 (explaining how the feminist victories of the 1940s and 1950s paved the
way for wage discrimination reform).
30 Ironically, the insertion of “sex” into Title VII is often said to have been either a joke
or a poison pill inserted to prevent passage of the bill. See infra note 60 and accompanying
text.
31 In fact, the police barred the women from actually burning bras. See Nell
Greenfieldboyce, Pageant Protest Sparked Bra-Burning Myth, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 5,
2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94240375. Following the
success of The Feminine Mystique, Friedan co-founded the National Organization of
Women (NOW). Another influential feminist, Gloria Steinem, a journalist whose writings
included After Black Power, Women’s Liberation, co-founded Ms. magazine in 1972.
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icies (indeed, coining the term “sexual harassment”32), women’s
studies departments in colleges and universities, and equal funding for
education and extra-curricular enrichment, among other things.33
As explained below, some—though by no means all—of these
victories came in the form of Title VII class actions brought by the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC),34 by labor
unions, and by individuals.35 During this time, feminists also devel-
oped (or redeveloped36) theories of gender as a social construct, of
systemic gender discrimination, and—among the rising number of
feminist lawyers—of feminist jurisprudence.37 Feminist theorists chal-
lenged not only the structure of the law, but also its language and
methodologies, as reflecting and perpetuating patriarchy.38 In order to
challenge the seeming objectivity of rational analysis, second-wave
feminists championed narrative scholarship.39 Echoing the long-
standing divide in the first wave between the social justice feminists
and the equality feminists, second-wave feminists also vehemently
32 See GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS
THAT CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 84–85 (2016) (describing how
three Cornell professors coined the term, which was picked up by a reporter and first
appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES in August, 1975); see generally CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is a structural, rather than an
individual, legal problem).
33 See, e.g., MEGAN SEELY, FIGHT LIKE A GIRL: HOW TO BE A FEARLESS FEMINIST
42–43 (2007) (describing accomplishments of second-wave feminists, including the
enactment of Title IX and the creation of women’s studies departments in colleges and
universities).
34 Title VII was amended in 1972 to grant the agency enforcement power. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 920261, § 706(f)(1), 86 Stat. 103, 105
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a) (2012)). See also Thomas J. Hart & George P.
Sape, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 824, 836–46 (describing legislative history of the Act).
35 See infra Part II.B.
36 See, e.g., COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 84 (noting that second-wave feminists were
generally unaware that “[b]y the end of the nineteenth century feminists like Elizabeth
Cady Stanton had elaborated a radical, sophisticated critique of male dominance and,
occasionally, of gender itself”).
37 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 (1983) (“The feminist theory of
knowledge is inextricable from the feminist critique of power because the male point of
view forces itself upon the world as its way of apprehending it.”).
38 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 47, 47–48 (1988) (criticizing feminism for universalizing gender while “ignoring
differences of racial, class, religious, ethnic, national, and other situated experiences”).
39 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens
of the California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 405–10 (2012) (describing how
narrative scholarship allows women to share their oftentimes traumatic experiences
stemming from gender-based oppression through story-telling, without implying that their
stories represent the experiences of all women).
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criticized the failings of their own movements. They could not agree
on whether feminists should push for equal access to a “men’s world,”
or whether they should seek accommodation for women’s differences,
particularly pregnancy.40 Radical feminists such as Catharine
MacKinnon went further, questioning the premise of the sameness/
difference model of equality.41 Finally, critical legal theorists deplored
the movement’s failure to squarely confront race or class or, often,
sexual orientation—particularly including the role that middle- and
upper-class white feminists played in maintaining those oppressive
hierarchies.42
By the end of the 1980s, women’s studies centers were regular
features of university landscapes and women were entering profes-
sional schools and other parts of the workforce in momentous num-
bers. Yet these gains, perhaps taken for granted,43 seem in key ways to
have weakened, rather than reinforced, feminism’s stature as a cul-
tural and political influence. The second-wave feminist movement was
one of the nation’s largest social movements.44 Despite, or perhaps
because of, its size, feminism lost its focus under the resurgence of
conservative politics under President Ronald Reagan.
In this sense, feminism’s so-called third wave—which emerged in
response to the outrage against Justice Clarence Thomas’s 1991
40 See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
206 (1988) (noting that “formal equality is not capable of discerning discrimination against
pregnant people”).
41 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1290–91 (1991) (“Then equality law tells women that they are entitled to equal
treatment mainly to the degree they are the same as men. The inadequacy of the sameness/
difference model, and its consequences for equality under law, are strikingly revealed by
the law’s treatment of women of color.”).
42 See, e.g., COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 92–100; BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN:
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 145 (1981) (noting that “many upper and middle class
white feminists who suffer least from sexist oppression were attempting to focus all
attention on themselves”); Minow, supra note 38. Recently, scholars have sought to revise
this history to reflect a greater racial integration in the women’s movement. See, e.g.,
FEMINIST COALITIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (Stephanie Gilmore ed., 2008) (“[W]e know from various scholarly
rejoinders and our own lived experiences that the movement was diverse, multifaceted,
and spoke to and for many women.”). Other scholars have argued that there was a greater
role for feminists in the passage of Title VII than the traditional story acknowledges. See
Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex
Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55 (2016); Serena Mayeri,
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-) History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 722 (2015) (“No
mere outsiders or gadflies, these women were enormously influential in Title VII’s early
development.”).
43 See JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG WOMEN,
FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 17 (2000) (“For our generation, feminism is like fluoride. We
scarcely notice that we have it—it’s simply in the water.”).
44 COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 71.
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confirmation hearings45—was in part a reaction to, and an over-
simplification of, the second wave. “Younger feminists argued that the
second wave was almost exclusively white (ignoring second-wave fem-
inists of color), overly puritanical . . . (ignoring diverse second-wave
perspectives on sexuality), and prescriptive . . . (ignoring the multi-
plicity of second-wave feminisms, plural).”46 The third wave was
defined by individualism and intersectionality, and—perhaps because
discrimination had become less explicit than it was during the age of
single-sex job descriptions—its goals were more difficult to tie to a
unifying political theme or action.47 In fact, it is unclear whether this
third wave can really be described as a feminist movement at all; many
women of this generation refused to self-identify as feminists. The
glass ceiling and the pay gap persisted, but the concept of feminism
became tainted, or at a minimum antiquated.48 The effects of this indi-
vidualism permeated the legal academy, where feminist theory
tapered off, although several influential scholars continued their work
and new voices drew on social science literature to critique the sys-
temic, implicit barriers to freedom from discrimination.49
45 In a 1992 edition of Ms. devoted to women’s reactions to the Thomas hearings,
Rebecca Walker, twenty two-year-old daughter of Alice Walker, wrote an analysis that
ended with the statement: “I am not a postfeminist feminist. I am the Third Wave.”
Rebecca Walker, Becoming the Third Wave, MS., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 39, http://
www.msmagazine.com/spring2002/BecomingThirdWaveRebeccaWalker.pdf. While that
statement took hold and defined the term “third-wave feminism,” it was only one of many
outraged reactions by feminists to Clarence Thomas’s appointment. For example, over
1600 women signed a full-page statement in the New York Times, “African American
Women in Defense of Ourselves.” COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 150. Also published in
this period were Susan Faludi’s Backlash in 1991 and Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth in
1991, seminal texts in the third wave of feminism.
46 COBBLE ET AL., supra note 7, at 170.
47 See, e.g., Gwendolyn Beetham, The Academic Feminist: Using the Past to Reimagine
the Present with Imani Perry , FEMINISTING, http://feministing.com/2012/01/24/the-
academic-feminist-using-the-past-to-reimagine-the-present-with-imani-perry-2/ (last visited
Sept. 7, 2017) (noting that “somewhere along the way, certain branches of third (and
fourth) wave feminism got caught up in the neoliberal fixation on personal choice and the
individual experience, embracing sexiness without challenging the larger power relations
that socialize the very ideas about what sexy is”).
48 See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN 2 (Three Rivers Press ed., 2006) (describing “[t]he prevailing wisdom of the past
decade” as holding that “[t]he women’s movement, as we are told time and again, has
proved women’s own worst enemy”); The Failure of Feminism, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 18, 1990,
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/failure-feminism-205870 (“[W]omen don’t belong in
12-hour-a-day executive office positions, and I can’t figure out today what ever made us
think we would want to be there in the first place.”).
49 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1227–37 (1995).
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Activists have identified the current age of feminism—allegedly
the fourth wave—with social media and podcasts, with intersection-
ality and internationalism, with fluidity of gender and sexual orienta-
tion, with marriage equality, and with ongoing battles against sexual
assault, particularly—though not only—on college campuses.50 In
those areas, activists and scholars have accomplished sweeping
change, often with vital assistance from courts.51 Despite (or perhaps
because of) this wide embrace, it was unclear until recently whether
these impulses would coalesce into a wide-ranging feminist movement
with social and legal influence such as Black Lives Matter.52 The 2017
Women’s March on Washington, which adopted a consciously inter-
sectional and inclusive agenda,53 may signal the onset of a newly invig-
orated, national movement; time will tell.
Thus far, feminism’s fourth wave has had a quiet presence in the
legal academy. Current gender theory continues the third-wave focus
on individualization and intersectionality rather than on a (presum-
ably confining and stereotypical) group identity.54 There are, however,
notable exceptions.55 And both in and out of the academy, despite a
50 See, e.g., ROXANE GAY, BAD FEMINIST, at xii–xiv (2014) (discussing the fourth
wave); J. JACK HALBERSTAM, GAGA FEMINISM: SEX, GENDER, AND THE END OF NORMAL
9–10 (2012) (discussing fluidity of gender); THE GUILTY FEMINIST, http://
guiltyfeminist.libsyn.com/ (“discuss[ing] topics ‘all 21st century feminists agree on’”) (last
visited Sept. 7. 2017); 2 DOPE QUEENS, http://www.wnyc.org/shows/dopequeens (“stories
about sex, romance, race, hair journeys, living in New York, and Billy Joel”) (last visited
Nov. 20, 2016).
51 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates recognition of same-sex marriages); Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 2017 WL 1230393 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2017) (holding that
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual
orientation).
52 Activists have characterized Black Lives Matter as a feminist movement. See Alicia
Garza, A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, THE FEMINIST WIRE (Oct. 7,
2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/ (“Black Lives Matter
affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks,
folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum.”).
53 Mission and Vision: Our Mission, WOMEN’S MARCH ON WASHINGTON, https://
www.womensmarch.com/mission/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter WOMEN’S
MARCH].
54 See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891,
895–96 (2014) (critiquing as outdated “a sex discrimination regime that still views the
group as the focal point of discrimination”); see also BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.,
https://genderlawjustice.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (explaining mandate “to
publish feminist legal scholarship . . . [on] the intersection of gender with one or more axis
of subordination”).
55 See, e.g., TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 2–5 (2017)
(arguing that organizations and groups, rather than mere individuals, must be responsible
for dismantling the discriminatory systems they have constructed); Tracy A. Thomas,
Reconsidering the Remedy of Gender Quotas, HARV. J. L. & GENDER (2016) (arguing that
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renewed focus on the intersection of race, class, and feminism, many
of the most prominent feminist voices—such as those seeking reme-
dies for campus sexual assaults through Title IX, or access to the
highest echelons of Silicon Valley—tend to focus on issues that are
most relevant among highly educated, wealthier women.56
The questions debated among women today—whether women
can obtain equality if they “lean in,”57 whether systemic change is the
only effective way to alter women’s experiences in the workplace, and
whether feminism can be separated from discrimination based on
race, class, and sexual orientation—have now been debated in femi-
nist circles for decades. Yet the events of 2016, culminating in Hillary
Clinton’s loss in the presidential election despite rampant and credible
sexual assault allegations against Donald Trump,58 bring into sharp
relief the fact that neither law, nor society, has yet answered these
questions. As the next Section shows, in addition to marches and pro-
tests,59 aggregate litigation has a role to play in remedying ongoing
gender discrimination.
B. Parallels in Class Action Doctrine
Title VII has transformed the lives of women at work, and—not
infrequently—it has done so through class litigation. This Section
shows that the waves of feminism (themselves buffeted by outside
social forces) are reflected in the expansion, and the subsequent con-
traction, in the effective use of class actions in Title VII sex discrimi-
nation cases.
the solution to the problem of racist systems may lie in the implementation of gender
quotas), http://harvardjlg.com/2016/11/reconsidering-the-remedy-of-gender-quotas/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2017); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle
Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559, 572–77 (2016) (discussing
childcare and family concerns as group identity issues).
56 See Susana Loza, Hashtag Feminism, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, and the Other
#FemFuture, ADA, http://adanewmedia.org/2014/07/issue5-loza/?utm_source=rss&utm_
medium=rss&utm_campaign=issue5-loza (last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (discussing a
movement that rejects “American feminism’s brand of solidarity, one which ‘centers on the
safety and comfort of white women’ at the expense of women of color”).
57 See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013).
58 Jia Tolentino, Trump and the Truth: The Sexual-Assault Allegations, THE NEW
YORKER (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-and-the-truth-
the-sexual-assault-allegations (discussing numerous sexual assault allegations made against
Donald Trump and the Access Hollywood tape where he bragged about sexually assaulting
women by noting that he would “just start kissing” nonconsenting women because “[w]hen
you’re a star, they let you do it”).
59 See WOMEN’S MARCH, supra note 53 (“We will not rest until women have parity and
equity at all levels of leadership in society. We work peacefully while recognizing there is
no true peace without justice and equity for all.”).
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Neither the amended Rule 23 nor Title VII existed during the
first wave of feminism. Once Rule 23 was adopted, however, the
second wave of feminism was marked by a significant number of Title
VII class actions, as courts grew increasingly comfortable with the new
procedural vehicle and newly willing to confront the widespread, gen-
erally explicit, discrimination against working women that persisted
into the 1980s. Indeed, there are more second-wave class action cases
adjudicating women’s rights under Title VII than in the third or fourth
wave combined.60
The cases during this period are held together by some notable
common themes. First—in line with the goals of second-wave femi-
nism—“second-wave” Title VII class actions for gender discrimination
tended to challenge explicit bias against women (or, on occasion,
men61) as embodied in facially discriminatory employment policies or
practices.62 In other words, rarely was a case brought that challenged
structural sexism or implicit bias. Instead, these early Title VII class
actions challenged policies such as gender-based job classifications
and requirements,63 gender-differentiated pension fund contribu-
tions,64 and sex-discriminatory promotion practices.65
60 The authors conducted a Westlaw search in the federal appellate court database for
reported “class action!” decisions involving “women” or “gender” or “female.” The results
were then categorized by feminist-wave dates. The first wave of feminism included zero
cases; the second wave included 126 cases; the third wave included nine cases; and the
fourth wave included twenty-two cases. This research is on file with the authors and the
N.Y.U. Law Review.
61 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (class of
men successfully challenging airline’s policy of hiring only women as flight attendants).
62 See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991) (challenging
policy barring all women, except those who could medically document infertility, from
certain higher-paying jobs); see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title
VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 709 (2003) (discussing
remedies that sought to “open[ ] up” opportunities by removing barriers and increasing the
number of out-group individuals in organizations by broadening recruitment efforts and
numerical hiring requirements).
63 E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1977) (challenging height and
weight requirements for corrections officers in state penitentiary); Am. Nurses’ Assoc. v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1986) (challenging male and female job classifications in
nursing that resulted in higher wages for men); Inda v. United Airlines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554,
556 (9th Cir. 1977) (case challenging no-marriage rule for only female flight attendants);
Diaz, 442 F.2d 385; Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1969)
(challenging job applications based on weight restrictions and how much women could
lift); McCrimmon v. Daley, 418 F.2d 366, 367 (7th Cir. 1969) (challenging law that would
not permit women to tend bar).
64 City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978)
(challenging policy that required women to make larger pension contributions because of
longer life span).
65 Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1365–66 (11th Cir. 1982) (challenging policy
that would not promote female officers even when their test scores and other application
qualifications exceeded the requirements); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co. Maternity Ben. Litig.,
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Second, notwithstanding the offensive jocularity that surrounded
the inclusion of “sex” in Title VII,66 and the initial reluctance by the
EEOC to prioritize sex discrimination,67 courts during this period
were by and large receptive to the efforts of women to obtain redress
through the use of Rule 23. This positive reception was due, in part, to
the auspicious conflation of courts’ acceptance of the class action
device and a robust, activist feminist movement.
As David Marcus has argued, in the period leading up to 1980
courts were receptive to the class action in part because they tended
to use the device pragmatically, without developing or referencing a
larger theory of Rule 23.68 In the context of Title VII, this pragmatism
often opened the door to Title VII sex discrimination class actions.
Courts during the second wave of feminism tended to grant class certi-
fication with a casual—almost non-analytical—approach to the
requirements of Rule 23.69 District courts generally reached the merits
of the cases either through a motion to dismiss, trial, preliminary
injunction, or summary judgment.70 Appellate courts reviewed those
merits and, like the district courts, only rarely had occasion to reflect
on class certification.71
602 F.2d 845, 846–47 (8th Cir. 1979) (challenging lack of guaranteed reinstatement into job
following maternity leave).
66 See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1014–21 (discussing and calling into question the story
that some Congressmen attempted to defeat the adoption of Title VII with the last-minute
inclusion of sex discrimination).
67 See id. at 1025–27 (“In the absence of concerted pressure from women’s groups,
early EEOC officials resisted the idea that sex discrimination was a serious social problem
akin to race discrimination or that sex-segregated employment reflected labor market
discrimination like racial segregation.”).
68 Marcus, supra note 8, at 626.
69 See Green, supra note 55, at 678–79 (noting that during the first ten years of Title
VII enforcement actions, “courts readily certified ‘across-the-board’ class actions in
employment discrimination cases, without much attention to the requirements of Rule
23”).
70 See, e.g., Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming trial court’s
determination that county discriminated against female officers in its promotion practices);
Am. Nurses Assoc. v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 718–19, 730 (7th Cir. 1986) (reversing district
court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss on merits of nurses’ Title VII job
classification claim); EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1508–09 (11th Cir.
1987) (enjoining defendant from violating Title VII by refusing to hire women or by
advertising positions for a specific gender); Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647,
651 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court’s bench trial judgment against class claims
alleging gender discrimination in hiring and promotion practices); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d
648, 649 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing and remanding district court’s decision to deny injunctive
relief because if female police officers could show that, except for sex, they would have
been hired early enough to accumulate sufficient seniority to withstand current layoffs,
there was a violation).
71 As a matter of procedure, appellate courts were often unable to take interlocutory
review of certification decisions following the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In that case, the Court struck down the so-called
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Reinforcing this procedural receptivity was a vigorous, nation-
wide feminist movement—described above—that provided political
and theoretical support for women’s workplace equality. Rule 23 may
have been undertheorized at this time,72 but women’s equality was
not. The Department of Justice, EEOC, Congress, and the courts were
all responsive to an active, organized movement advocating for
women’s equality.73 As a result, many second-wave Title VII class
action plaintiffs prevailed.74 District courts taking a narrow view of
discrimination in these cases were reversed with surprising fre-
quency.75 Perhaps the emblematic second-wave Title VII class action
death-knell doctrine of interlocutory appeal, meaning that until the adoption of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(f) in 1997, most certification decisions were effectively unreviewable. Id. at 465.
Moreover, the rare cases where certification was denied did not appear to be all that
controversial. For instance, in one case, the district and appellate courts denied
certification where the plaintiff’s claims were clearly individual and plaintiff did not show
other potential class members necessary to satisfy numerosity. See Mazus v. Dep’t of
Transp., 629 F.2d 870, 874–76 (3d Cir. 1980). However, some class certification decisions
were not so cut and dry. For example, in Merrill v. Southern Methodist University, 806 F.2d
600 (5th Cir. 1986), the court denied certification of a plaintiffs’ class of women who were
employed or would be employed at SMU and suffer the gender discrimination in tenure
decisions. Id. at 608. The court affirmed the denial of certification, in part, because of lack
of commonality. There were no alleged “disparate impact” rules or policies. Id. The court
worried that because each tenure denial would “turn[ ] on unique facts: the quality of this
professor’s teaching, the substance of her publications, the range of her service,” the
proposed class action would “have quickly disintegrated into a plethora of individual
claims.” Id.
72 See Marcus, supra note 8, at 626 (describing courts’ use of Rule 23 as “[a]t times
doctrinally unprincipled and often undertheorized”).
73 See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1039–46 (describing successes by NOW and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s ACLU Women’s Rights Project in pushing for strong sex discrimination
law under Title VII).
74 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(finding in favor of a class of women employees challenging city pension plan that required
women to make larger contributions than men based on actuarial finding that women lived
longer); Bouman, 940 F.2d 1211 (finding in favor of class of women employees alleging sex
discrimination claims in L.A. County Sheriff Department’s promotion practices); Capaci,
711 F.2d 647 (finding in favor of class of women employees alleging sex discrimination in
employer manager trainee program); Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
(finding in favor of class of women employees challenging company’s policy of barring
women from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure).
75 For example, in Marsh v. Eaton Corp., 639 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1981), the district court
did not find prima facie evidence of gender discrimination where 100% of the women hired
during a four-year period were placed in the lowest positions within the company while
only 52.9% of the men hired were placed in those positions. Id. at 329. This distribution
occurred even when the female and male applicants were often equally well-qualified for
different positions. Id. at 330. The district court determined that a small sample size of only
forty-four employees prevented it from finding prima facie sex discrimination. Id. at 329.
The appellate court reversed, though it found that a small company could avoid liability for
unlawful hiring practices simply by virtue of being a smaller enterprise. Id.; see also Int’l
Union, 499 U.S. 187 (holding that a company’s fetal-protection policy of barring all
women, except those who were not fertile, from jobs where employees were exposed to
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was UAW v. Johnson Controls, in which the Supreme Court held that
the defendant company’s policy of excluding women, but not men, of
childbearing age from jobs that might expose them to lead violated
Title VII. The Court found the bias in the policy to be “obvious,” and
it rejected the company’s defense that the policy was necessary for
fetal protection.76 Notably, in upholding the women’s claims, the
Court never even analyzed Rule 23’s requirements.77
During the heyday of second-wave feminism, Title VII plaintiffs
made substantial gains for women in the workplace, including through
the use of the new Rule 23. But just as the third wave of feminism—
starting in the early 1990s—was less unified and weaker than its pred-
ecessor, Title VII class actions also entered a more complex phase
during this period. Notably, the early case law contributed to this
problem. First, one result of courts’ lack of Rule 23 analysis in early
cases was a smaller corpus of cases broadly supporting (and
explaining) certification, including commonality and the scope of Rule
23(b)(2)’s reach.78 Though it became a routine element of federal liti-
gation, Rule 23 remained something of a cipher. Similarly, the blatant
nature of the discriminatory policies in the 1970s and 1980s made the
cases of that era only somewhat informative of the less obvious, more
subjective forms of discrimination that permeated Title VII class
actions starting in the 1990s for plaintiffs in race as well as sex discrim-
ination cases.79 In addition, the political landscape shifted during the
1990s, as both feminism and class actions suffered backlashes. Finally,
the law itself changed: The 1991 amendments to Title VII allowed
plaintiffs to recover both punitive and compensatory damages80 and
lead was discriminatory under Title VII and not a bona fide occupational qualification,
after the district court held otherwise). It is not as if all plaintiffs were successful, however.
For example, in Valentino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1982), then-Judge
Ginsburg held that the plaintiff class failed to present prima facie evidence of
discrimination because of its “unrefined statistics coupled with [its insufficient] non-
statistical evidence.”
76 499 U.S. at 197; id. at 207 (“Johnson Controls has attempted to exclude women
because of their reproductive capacity. Title VII and the PDA simply do not allow a
woman’s dismissal because of her failure to submit to sterilization.”).
77 Id. at 211 (announcing the holding as an interpretation of the PDA, without
mentioning Rule 23).
78 See Marcus, supra note 17, at 781 (noting that “[o]ld-era judges certified classes
casually, even perfunctorily, and thus did not build a reservoir of doctrinal wisdom to guide
Rule 23’s application in [public interest class action] cases”).
79 Compare notes 57–59 and accompanying text (describing lawsuits challenging overt
discrimination against women in the workplace) with Green, supra note 56, at 680–81
(discussing how during this time discrimination became viewed as more “individualiz[ed],”
leading to a lower number of class actions).
80 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) and (b)(3) (2012) (providing for punitive and compensatory
damages, respectively).
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Rule 23 was amended in 1998 to allow for a more amenable interlocu-
tory appeal of certification decisions.81 Nevertheless, in practice many
courts in the 1990s adhered to their earlier, pragmatic approach to
class certification.82
As a result of these contradictory trends, class actions during the
third wave of feminism present a mixed picture. Courts in many third-
wave Title VII sex discrimination cases certified classes where the
alleged discrimination was based on discretionary promotional or
other employment practices across a company, frequently finding
expert statistical evidence sufficient to establish Rule 23(a)(2)’s com-
monality requirement.83 Before the 1991 amendments to Title VII,
courts also regularly allowed plaintiffs to seek incidental back and
front pay by treating those remedies as equitable and thus permitted
under a Rule 23(b)(2) certification.84 With the addition of potential
compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII, some courts sought
to balance class-wide and individualized harms by certifying hybrid
classes, with Rule 23(b)(2) governing the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief and Rule 23(b)(3) covering compensatory claims.85
Other courts began to see complications in suits seeking both injunc-
tive relief and money damages. These courts saw the potential for
both compensatory and punitive damages as prohibitive. Most
notably, in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the Fifth Circuit held
that class action employment discrimination suits seeking injunctive
relief and money damages could only be certified when the damages
were “incidental,” and it rejected any kind of hybrid approach to cer-
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (allowing for discretionary interlocutory appeal of class
certification decisions). Notably, the Judicial Conference asked the Advisory Committee to
look at whether Rule 23 should be amended to allow for interlocutory appeal in 1991. See
Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917 (2017).
82 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Hnot v. Willis Grp. Holdings Ltd., 241 F.R.D. 204, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(relying on statistical evidence to find commonality in disparate impact case); Anderson v.
Boeing Co., 222 F.R.D. 521, 537 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (same); Marquis v. Tecumseh Prods.
Co., 206 F.R.D. 132, 158 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding commonality based on plaintiffs’
allegations that defendant’s anti-harassment policies were inadequate or non-existent,
though the court ultimately decided not to certify based on the requirements); Beckmann
v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608, 613 (D. Minn. 2000) (agreeing with other courts that
“allegations of similar discriminatory employment practices, such as the use of entirely
subjective personnel processes that operate to discriminate, satisfy the commonality and
typicality requirements of 23(a)”).
84 See Green, supra note 55, at 698 (noting that courts often certified classes seeking
both injunctive relief and back pay as Rule 23(b)(2) class actions “despite the individual
issues thereby created”). The courts would generally bifurcate the proceedings to allow the
liability phase to be adjudicated before addressing the individualized remedies members of
the class were seeking. See id. at 698–99.
85 See, e.g., id. at 703 (describing the process by which courts establish a hybrid class
action in order to address due process concerns).
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tification because of concerns about predominance.86 Still other
courts—foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s tone in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes—rejected commonality in situations where discretionary deci-
sions were at play.87 These courts were skeptical of statistical experts
yet they also found anecdotal evidence insufficient.88 Often this hos-
tility to commonality appeared when the class included women with
significantly different job descriptions.89 On a deeper level though,
some of the cases rejecting commonality among classes of women
evince disbelief that gender discrimination—rather than individual
choices, or a multitude of other factors—were causing the statistical
differences.90 At the same time, the divided, inwardly focused genera-
86 151 F.3d 402, 415, 418–20 (5th Cir. 1998).
87 The seeds of this skepticism were, in part, initially sown in a case addressing claims of
racial discrimination where the Supreme Court rejected the certification of an across-the-
board class of Mexican American employees and applicants alleging employment
discrimination. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). More specifically, the
Court stated, “If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to
support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential companywide
class action. We find nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to authorize
such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation.” Id. at 159. See also Green, supra
note 55, at 691 n.138 (cataloguing a set of racial and gender employment discrimination
cases where courts rejected commonality on the basis of discretionary decision making).
88 See, e.g., Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We have never held
that subjective decision-making processes require a district court to find commonality for
purposes of class certification.”); Grosz v. Boeing, No. 04-55428, 2005 WL 1515070, at *1
(9th Cir., June 28, 2005) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to not certify a class
where employer used discretionary hiring practices and class contained diversity of job
descriptions); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 465–68 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding
no commonality based on expert’s statistics, reports, and affidavits of class members);
Birdsong v. City of Memphis, 224 F.R.D. 634, 640 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[G]iven the
different managers, supervisory chains, decisions, and each Plaintiff’s varying history
within the [police] Department, this determination would require investigation into
hundreds of current or former employees”). But see Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-
4335 SI, 1996 WL 421436 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1996) (certifying a class of female employees
and applicants alleging gender-biased hiring, training, transfer, promotion, and
compensation on the basis of statistical and anecdotal evidence).
89 See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 02-3105, 2003 WL 22734623, at
*34 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2003) (rejecting district court’s class certification for lack of “rigorous
analysis,” and noting that class included laundry workers, graphic artists, biologists, and
corrections officers, among others).
90 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011) (“To the contrary,
left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in
a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”);
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (attributing
statistical evidence of gender disparities within sales-commission positions to disinterest
among women because they “feared or disliked the perceived ‘dog-eat-dog’ competition
. . . were uncomfortable or unfamiliar with the products sold on commission . . . [or]
fear[ed] being unable to compete, being unsuccessful [or] losing their jobs”). See generally
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study
of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI.
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tion of third-wave feminists no longer presented a unified political or
theoretical stance that could combat this skepticism.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart—a case that sets the
standard for Title VII class actions in feminism’s fourth wave—com-
bined and enshrined these various strains of skepticism. Its decision
was premised on the unsupported assumption that employers gener-
ally do not discriminate against women, whether intentionally, negli-
gently, or as a result of systemic biases.91 Because of this assumed
norm of non-discrimination, the women in the class could have no
common claims; just being women was of no moment.92 In one strike,
the Court simultaneously contracted both its Rule 23 and Title VII
jurisprudence. Indeed, as the third wave of feminism came to a close,
the auspicious conflation of a flexible approach to Rule 23 and an
active feminist movement had given way to class action skepticism
and fractured feminism.
Entering the fourth wave, feminism and Title VII class actions
continue to present a complicated story. There is the bleak side:
Courts addressing Title VII class actions post-Wal-Mart have
undoubtedly been affected by the Wal-Mart majority’s cramped defi-
nition of commonality.93 Unsurprisingly, this is most apparent in cases
L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1992) (arguing that perceptions of women as “marginal workers,
whose early socialization (or even biological predisposition) to stereotypically ‘feminine’
roles precludes a commitment to nontraditional work” mean that courts believe that
“women workers ‘choose’ lower-paying, female-dominated jobs to preserve their feminine
identities and their familial roles.”).
91 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (stating without citation that “most managers in any
corporation . . . would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and
promotion that produces no actionable disparity at all”).
92 See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1066 (noting that Wal-Mart “reaffirmed a line of
caselaw that denies the reality of workplace sex discrimination and casts doubt on the need
for Title VII”).
93 See Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 116 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming
district court’s denial of class certification because the “complaint fails to allege that the
‘subjectivity and stereotyping’ regarding compensation paid to female store managers were
exercised in a common way with some common direction,” but acknowledging that
plaintiffs’ amended complaint of higher-management level discrimination might survive
Wal-Mart scrutiny); Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ class-wide allegations because they had not alleged a “common mode of
exercising discretion that pervade[d] the entire company,” quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at
256, but had instead only shown a “highly discretionary policy for granting promotions”);
Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court decision to
deny class certification because “[a]s in Dukes, the gravamen of Davis’s claim is not that
the Meticulous Hiring System’s objective criteria led to an anti-female bias, but that
subjective decisions made by some of Cintas’s managers favored males because of Cintas’s
male-dominated corporate culture”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th
Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding the district court’s decision to certify a class because it
used admissible evidence as the sole evidence of commonality when it was not clear that
nationwide discrimination existed).
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like Wal-Mart where there is no written or stated corporate policy of
discrimination, but instead an allegation that lower-level managers are
exercising their discretion in variant discriminatory ways. As one
court explained quite plainly, “[W]here persons who are afforded dis-
cretion exercise that discretion differently, commonality is not estab-
lished.”94 Yet, there is also hope: Lawyers and courts are
distinguishing Wal-Mart and finding ways to construct Title VII class
actions that can withstand heightened scrutiny. Ellis v. Costco Whole-
sale Corp.,95 for example, involved a nationwide class of women
alleging discrimination in promotion and hiring. The Ellis class con-
sisted of just two closely-related management positions, and it alleged
that Costco’s decisions were guided by specific practices that came
from top-level management.96 In this way, the case was different
enough from Wal-Mart to survive certification; perhaps that is a sign
that Title VII impact litigation can survive.
Yet, much like the current wave of feminism—where the move-
ment is at once atomizing and attempting to coalesce—the limitations
placed on Title VII class actions threaten to reduce the effective-
ness of this kind of litigation for all women. That Ellis helped only
management-level women and relied on executive-level policies
means that women in lower-paying jobs—those who are often dis-
criminated against on the basis of inherent bias wielded through dis-
cretionary acts—may not be able to use Title VII class actions to
remedy the discrimination they experience. In other words, current
Title VII class actions and feminism suffer the same critique: They
appear to help predominantly the haves rather than the have-nots.
Outside of Rule 23, other legal developments such as the onset of
arbitration clauses and class action waivers threaten the viability of
Title VII class actions as well. For instance, in Parisi v. Goldman Sachs
& Co.,97 the Second Circuit found that where the plaintiff had signed
a binding arbitration clause in her employment agreement, she had no
right to bring a class action asserting a collective pattern-or-practice
discrimination claim under Title VII.98 Her only recourse was indi-
94 In re Wells Fargo Residential Mortg. Lending Discrimination Litig., No. 08-MD-
01930 MMC, 2011 WL 3903117, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011).
95 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The case settled for $8 million. See Kate Cox,
Costco Settles Gender-Discrimination Lawsuit for $8 Million, THE CONSUMERIST (Dec. 20,
2013), https://consumerist.com/2013/12/20/costco-settles-gender-discrimination-lawsuit-for-
8-million/. But see Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-6292 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL
6256978, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011) (relying on Wal-Mart in refusing to certify class of
female employees alleging gender discrimination and retaliation).
96 Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 509.
97 710 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 2013).
98 Id. at 488.
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vidual arbitration.99 Consumer contracts that include class action
waivers in their arbitration clauses have already been blessed by the
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.100 To the
extent employment contracts include similar provisions, it appears
that those clauses are also likely to be enforced.101 While there is
some momentum behind regulating the inclusion of class action
waivers in some contracts,102 the future of that regulation is
uncertain.103
In sum, the modern Title VII class action, like modern feminism,
is of uncertain strength and influence as a tool for social change.104 In
contrast with the widespread feminist movement before 1990, the
sense of commonality among women has weakened. The celebrated—
although imperfect—feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s has frac-
tured. That weakened commonality between women in the feminist
movement has permeated Title VII class action doctrine. It remains to
be seen whether both feminism and the class action will remain viable
tools under a new administration and a changing Supreme Court.
99 Id.
100 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
101 See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J.
1569, 1592, 1595 (2016) (predicting that “consumer and employment class actions will
decline in the next decade” due to the Court’s blessing of the class action waiver and citing
recent studies showing that employers are adopting the approach). Moreover, as this
article goes to print, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on a trilogy of cases
presenting a circuit split as to whether the National Labor Relations Act prohibits
employment agreements that forbid collective action (in arbitration or in court). See Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285 (U.S. consolidated Jan. 13, 2017).
102 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau proposed a rule banning class action
waiver provisions from contracts between banks and consumers. See CFPB Proposes
Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers Their Day in
Court, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 5, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposes-prohibiting-manda
tory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-day-court/. Similarly, the NLRB
ruled that class action waivers are void, which led to a circuit split on the issue. DR Horton,
Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012). Compare Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 983
(9th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the NLRB that the class action waiver was unenforceable)
with D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing the NLRB’s
decision to void class action waivers).
103 See Perry Cooper, Trump Presidency Creates Uncertainty for Arbitration Rules,
BLOOMBERG BNA NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.bna.com/trump-presidency-creates-
n57982082665/ (arguing that Trump’s support for arbitration prior to his election suggests
that recent increases in the regulation of arbitration agreements could be reversed during
his presidency).
104 In other class action contexts, however, the outlook may not be quite as grim. See
Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971
2017 (arguing that the decline of the class action has slowed since 2013).
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CONCLUSION
Movements require new ideas, new people—new blood—to sur-
vive. Feminism and Title VII class action doctrine both need to har-
ness the wisdom of middle age as well as the ingenuity of a new
generation of theorists and litigants. As history has shown, when femi-
nist scholars actively engage the debate surrounding legal procedure
and substance—as occurred in early Title VII litigation—courts will
listen.105 Without scholarship that can theorize and translate feminist
thought into the language of procedure, however, courts may fill that
theoretical vacuum with holdings that indicate judicial doubt about
the ongoing existence and severity of sex discrimination in the work-
place. As in Wal-Mart, courts may presume that women “as women”
lack commonality, and that systemic bias is either overblown, a relic of
the past, or both.
In addition to offering scholarship that documents the ongoing
role of systemic gender discrimination in the American workforce, a
robust scholarly defense of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions remains critical
to achieving the anti-discrimination goals of Title VII.106 First, institu-
tional change cannot generally be achieved through individual litiga-
tion.107 Class actions bring public attention to how women are treated
in the workplace without placing the full burden of that battle on a
single plaintiff.108 Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, which lack an opt-out
mechanism, make it easier for employees to be members of a class
without incurring retaliation from their employers. Moreover, Rule
23(b)(2) class actions are particularly important when agencies such as
the EEOC are not aggressively pursuing claims, as is likely to be the
case following the 2016 presidential election. Second, this form of
class action—at least in theory—can effectively provide relief to
women who do not have the means to pursue individual litigation.
This participatory aspect of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions is not just a
practical benefit to women seeking redress, but also a significant dem-
ocratic one that gives voice to those who might otherwise be marginal-
ized. Finally, Rule 23(b)(2) addresses structural, organizational
discriminatory practices through its primary remedy: injunctive relief.
105 See supra Section II.A, especially note 25 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 455, 488 (2014) (“[C]lass actions are part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.”).
107 See Green, supra note 55, at 678 (arguing that “courts are often unwilling to
implement organizational solutions for individual discriminatory decisions”).
108 See id. at 673 (arguing that the public attention that comes from discrimination
claims, particularly class action claims, may pressure organizations to reform).
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Despite a decade or more of backlash against feminism and
against class actions, Title VII class actions under Rule 23(b)(2)
remain a vital mechanism for eradicating sex discrimination in the
workplace. It is possible to describe Wal-Mart as a bookend to an era
of aggregate gender discrimination law—an era that made only partial
progress, leaving many women behind. We hope that a new genera-
tion of lawyers, litigants, and scholars will resist that narrative, and
will instead reinvigorate the concept of commonality among women.
